individual's own interest, while at the same time the psyche force is described as a countable, calculable, correctable, controllable and utilizable moral force or capital for the interest of the nation and the coming civil society. The individual at this converging point both as the liberalist political economic agent and as the ethical-calculable nationalist moral subject is then placed within the nationalist project of cultivation, training and correction. The aim of this essay is to answer the question why, in the Chinese context historically and culturally, the modern subject is so prone to the domination of the nationalist sentiments. I would like to argue that, long before the May Fourth intellectuals' efforts to awake the enlightenment movement in the 1919, the mode of a governable and calculable modern subject had been established through the revolutionary intellectuals' discursive responses to the contemporary world. It is what I called the moments of the birth of ethical-bio-politics in early modern China. In order to probe effectively into the complexity of this issue, I need to first run through the main argument in Foucault's book The The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978 -1979 . I consider Fouault's lectures of this year a significant link to his later lectures on the ethical subject and the hermeneutics of subject that point to the ambiguous problems of bio-politics of today.
The crossroads of political economy and the rise of new civil society 2
In Foucault's lectures during 1978-1979 on the birth of biopolitics, the double movement of the mechanism of liberalist political economic is closely studied and localized: on the one hand, it relies on the individual's volunteering and autonomous commitment with his free will to work and to exercise his potential; one the other hand, it takes the entire life of the individual, including the physical and moral hygiene, into account for the management and production for the enterprise. According to Foucault, starting from the eighteenth century, there is the attempt in the discourse of political economy to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population. Foucault takes liberalism as a principle and method of the rationalization of the exercise of government, a rationalization that obeys "the internal rule of maximum economy." (Foucault 2008: 318) Even though liberal thought starts from the civil society instead of the state, the question behind it is how to govern. In this line of thought, government becomes necessary and the justification of its existence defines the ends it pursues with regard to the particular society. The technology of a particular government and its forms of schematization is actually derived from the rationalization of the composition of that society. When the logic of political economy is superimposed on the logic of social governmentality, it gives rise to what Foucault called the "birth of biopolitics." The intriguing problem about the liberalist economic subject or the economic man, homo oeconomicus, is that, although it is let alone to do his own work in the economic system, following the principle of laisser-faire, his is "eminently governable." (Foucault 2008: 270) The individual would pursue his own interest, but his interest has already been posited in the way that it would converge spontaneously with the interest of others. Homo oeconomicus, according to Foucault, is actually the person "who accepts reality" and therefore "someone manageable, someone who responds systematically to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment," and consequently "the correlate of a governmentality." (Foucault 2008: 270-271) The paradox of the liberalist economic man Foucault presents in his studies points to the fact that, instead of an atom of freedom, the home oeconomicus is already a certain type of subject who precisely enable an art of government to be determined according to the principle of economy. This problem of home oeconomicus leads Foucault to reconsider the concept of subject introduced by English empiricism, that is, a subject not defined by his freedom, or by the opposition of body and soul, or by the presence of something marked by the Fall or sin, but a form of subject of individual choices which are both irreducible and nontransferable. This irreducible and non-transferable point is the "regressive end point" of the rationality, judgment, reasoning, or calculation of the individual choices and is referred to the subject himself as "interest." This "subject of interest," whether it is related to self-preservation or to sympathy, is primarily based on "subjective will." Even though subjected and constrained by the contract, the "subject of interest" remains, subsists and continues up to the time of the juridical contract and overflows the "subject of right." (Foucault 2008: 272-274) 
4
The different logic governing the subject of interest and the subject of right is that the subject of right is by definition a split subject who acknowledges some natural and immediate rights but also agrees to the principle of self-renunciation, as what law and the prohibition function in the juridical system, but the subject of interest, according to the economists, never has to relinquish his interest. Foucault points out that in the eighteenth century, the figure of home oeconomicus and the figure of homo juridicus or homo legalis are heterogeneous and cannot be superimposed on each other. Foucault refers to Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations and stressed the importance of the "invisibility" of the hand of the "totality" which eludes the individual while at the same time founds the rationality of his egoistic choices and, Foucault adds, "if the totality of the process eludes each economic man, there is however a point where the whole is completely transparent to a sort of gaze of someone whose invisible hand, following the logic of this gaze and what it sees, draws together the threads of all these dispersed interest." The invisibility of the collective good is essential to the process because the collective good "must not be an objective" and "cannot not be calculated." (Foucault 2008: 278-280) No economic agent or political agent should or could account for the totality of the process of the collective good. Foucault writes:
Thus the economic world is naturally opaque and naturally non-totalizable. It is originally and definitively constituted from a multiplicity of points of view which is all the more irreducible as this same multiplicity assures their ultimate and spontaneous convergence. Economics is an atheistic discipline; economics is a discipline without God; economics is a discipline without totality; economics is a discipline that begins to demonstrate not only the pointlessness, but also the impossibility of a sovereign point of view over the totality of the state that he has to govern. Economics steals away from the juridical form of the sovereign exercising sovereignty within a state precisely that which is emerging as the essential element of a society's life, namely economic processes. Liberalism acquired its modern shape precisely with the formulation of this essential incompatibility between the non-totalizable multiplicity of economic subjects of interest and the totalizing unity of the juridical sovereign. (Foucault 2008: 282, emphasis mine) 
5
To Foucault, the heterogeneity and incompatibility of the economic world and the political-juridical world of the eighteenth century could serve as a critique of governmental reason. The basic function of Adam Smith's theory of the invisible hand is to disqualify the political sovereign. But, throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, different forms of socialism, state socialism and the state-controlled economy, all tried to work out some kind of definition of the economic sovereignty. The principle of laissez-faire in the physiocrats, for example, is to establish the correspondence between the sovereign and the economic processes or the economic agents, basing on the evidence and the Economic Table they constructed. It is here, Foucault says, that we find the idea that "economic agents must be allowed their freedom" and that "a political sovereignty will cover the totality of the economic process with a gaze in the uniform light, as it were, of evidence." (Foucault 2008: 285-286) 6 What Foucault offers is a very complex picture of the intersection and crossroad of the political economic and the political governmentality. According to Foucault, Adam Smith's theory from the start was not meant to serve as governmentality rationality. "Economic science cannot be the science of government and economics cannot be the internal principle, law, rule of conduct, or rationality of government." (Foucault 2008: 286) But, when the two incompatible worlds collate and superimposed on one another, the questions arises: how is the theory of the invisible hand served as the governmental rationality? How is the theory of civil society served as the converging point of political economic and governmentality rationality? The governability or governmentability of the economic subject is made possible through a "new ensemble" which makes him both subject of right and subject of economic agents, and this convergence brings in what Foucault calls "the liberal art of governing," the field where such liberalist governmentality could exercise is "civil society." (Foucault 2008: 294-295) 7 Here is the crucial question that Foucault proposes in his seminar, and it is also the central concern of my current study: what is the rationality and the technology to govern, according to the rule of right, the civil society, a space of sovereignty which is inhabited by economic subject? Foucault points out that civil society is not a philosophical idea, but a concept of governmental technology, and the problem of civil society is "the juridical structure of a governmentality pegged to the economic structure." Foucault writes:
And I think that civil society-which is very quickly called society, and which at the end of the eighteenth century is called the nation-makes a self-limitation possible for governmental practice and an art of government, for reflection on this art of government and so for a governmental technology. … An omnipresent government, a government which nothing escapes, a government which conforms to the rules of right, and a government which nevertheless respects the specificity of the economy, will be a government that manages civil society, the nation, society, the social. (Foucault 2008: 296) 8 How should the subject be managed so that he can be left alone, laisser-faire, and work for his own interest while the whole nation or the civil society can benefit according to the rationality of the government? The omnipresent government is built upon these autonomous economic subjects. "Homo oeconomicus is, if you like, the abstract, ideal, purely economic point that inhabits the dense, full, and complex reality of civil society. Or, alternatively, civil society is the concrete ensemble within which these ideal points, economic men, must be placed so that they can be appropriately managed." (Foucault 2008: 296) It is in this same ensemble of the technology of liberal governmentality that homo oeconomicus and civil society belong.
9
The irony is clear here. The civil society invoked to resist against the government or the state, the state apparatuses or institutions, turns out to be the very thing that forms part of modern governmental technology. Foucault demonstrates how Adam Smith's economic
The Count of Psyche : The birth of bio-politics and bio-ethics in early moder... Appareil, 4 | 2010 analysis is transformed in Furgerson's text as the theories of civil society, combining Smith's concept of nation, including viewing civil society as an historical-natural constant, with spontaneous synthesis of individuals, a permanent matrix of political power and that it constitutes the "motor of history." The civil society or the nation is the motor of history precisely because it is not only the spontaneous synthesis and subordination but it also carries the element of dissociation, that is, the egoism of homo oeconomicus. The multiplications and modifications of the blind initiatives of the egoist interests and individual calculations are infinite, and the transformation of civil society is endless. This never-ending generation of history makes the formation of new social fabric possible. Also, civil society calls for a government as an organic component of the social bond as an organic feature of the form of authority. These characteristics make the civil society in Furguson's text very different from that of Hobbes, Rousseau and Montesquieu because the economic problems are introduced into new technologies of government. (Foucault 2008: 298-308) 10 The crossroads Foucault analyzes in Furguson's text reveal a domain opening up of collective and political units which go beyond the purely economic bond, and yet without being purely juridical, and that this space cannot be superimposed on the structures of the contract and the game of rights. But, the demand for a new form of civil society gives rise to new forms of sovereign individuality basing on the strategy of interests of the individual sovereign, and to new forms of truth that is manifested through the rationality of history. Just as what Foucault points out, since the sixteen and seventeenth century in the West, the exercise of power has been adjusted according to calculation of force, relations, wealth and factors of strength. Rationality becomes the foundation of modern forms of governmental technology. Different forms of rationality, the rationality of the sovereign state, of economic agents, of the governed, speak about different ways of calculating and regulating the art of government. The principle of rationality of the nationalist and statist politics as well as the rationality of the truth regime continue in spite of the transformations of the technologies of governmentality. The birth of the new forms of calculation and regulation of the civil society or the nationalist state in the twentieth century, ways of governing the population, including health, hygiene, birth, race, and so on, is founded precisely through the long process of the discourse of political economy since mid-eighteenth century down to the nineteenth century.
11 To me, the problem lies more in how in such crossroads and intersections, with the cleaving up and opening of new space for civil society, even though the juridical system and economic bond has not been established yet, the discursive modes of new ways of calculation and regulation has already infiltrated in the same texts. The crucial question is: how the individual in the society, a society in the making, a society that is invoked to rebel against the present government, is accounted for the rise either of a new civil society or a new nation state, and through what irreducible rationality and reasoning these individuals are posited. The texts that I would like to examine in this current essay point to what I called the moments of the birth of ethical-bio-politics in modern China. I would like to argue that, in late Qing China, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, on the eve of the republic's revolution, and twenty years before the May Fourth Enlightenment Movement, the emerging new mode of discourse on the "count" of psyche among the intellectuals gives rise to the rationality of psyche ruling for later governments. With the borrowed Western knowledge of modern physics and chemistry on the one hand, and the theories of political economy and the
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civil society/nation state on the other hand, Chinese intellectuals, through the aids of the missionaries in China and the translated texts from Japan, build up a mode of hermeneutics on psyche that stresses on the countable, utilizable, controllable, accumulative, and correctable nature of psyche. Psyche force was described as the force, using the metaphor of electricity, to be tamed and directed so that it can serve the aims of the State. Moreover, the individual's psyche force was accounted as part of the national capital and as a share that is responsible for the production of the national interest, in Benthamian reasoning. Liang Qichao's essay on the "New People" was an exemplary text that demonstrated how the ethical subject was constructed in the way that the bio (life) and the ethics of the individuals were discursively formulated in an ethico-politicaleconomic to contribute to the collective good defined in the name of nation.
Liang Qichao and the ethical-political economy for the new people
12 Liang Qichao was the most prominent revolutionary intellectual among those who welcomed and elaborated the rejuvenated China through the rejuvenated psyche power of the citizen of a coming society in late Qing China. Liang Qichao fled to Japan with his teacher Kang Youwei after the failure of the short-lived Hundred Days' Reform in 1898, and stayed abroad in exile for 15 years. During this period of exile, he studied Western knowledge extensively through Chinese translations as well as Japanese translations, and he reintroduced them into Chinese in new forms embedded with his erudite knowledge of classical Chinese texts. His enormous amount of writings greatly influenced the path of Chinese modernization.
13 To reform and build a modern China, Liang Qichao places his hope not in the leader but in the people. Liang develops his idea of the capacity and the rights of people in his seminal book On the New People (xinminshuo, 新民說 1902) as the foundation for a strong nationstate. He stresses that, to resist the expanding forces of the national imperialism of the foreign nations, the only method to take was through reinforcing the people's own sense of nationalism. (Liang, On the New People 657) He uses the analogy of biological body to compare with the State: the State is composed with its people, as if a body is composed with its limbs, intestines, nerves and veins. If the parts and limbs were weak, diseased or even broken, the body could not maintain its proper condition and would even perish. The same case could be applied to the State. If we wanted the State to be strong and wealthy, Liang suggests, we first had to consider the ways to maintain the nutrition and life of the State by ways of cultivating its new people. (Liang, On the New People 655) Liang Qichao, commenting on Rousseau, emphasizes the importance of the public opinion and the juridical contract, in addition to the physiological vision of the state, as the foundation for the operation of the nation. On top of the physiological formulation of the juridical and contractual relation between the individual and the State, Liang Qichao situates the ethical position of the individual in the mode of economic production. Liang lists and elaborates the meaning of each of the moral virtues, so called common virtues ( gongde), the aim of which, to Liang Qichao, are to lead to the people's political ability of qun, being a social member, and to enhance the interest of the society (liqun 利群): to consolidate the group, improve the group and make it progress. The common virtues are indispensible in Liang's portrayal of a new society, such as responsibility, autonomous self-governing, self-esteem, bravery, endurance, advantageousness, progressiveness, 15 What then is the role of "interest" in Liang's formulation of the "new people" in such evolutionist vision of the State? Liang Qichao encourages people not only to fight for their "self-interest" but also to aim at the "real self-interest" (zhenliji). So-called "real self-interest" is defined in terms of the nation-state. One has to nourish the thoughts of interest of society, that is, the nation-state, so that they can forever secure their own interests. Liang Qichao even analyzes the modes of production according to the interest of the nation-state and specifies that ducation and cultivation are necessary methods to strengthen the nation-state. Liang compares the State as a corporation, and the imperial court as the business office. In order to produce and maintain the interests (「生利」) of the nation-state, it is necessary to demand the force of production from the people. Liang defines the forces of production as physical force and psyche force (xinli 心力), the later involved the intellectual force (zhili 智力) and the moral force (deli 德力). He insists that the prosperity or the fall of a nation-state depends on its capacity for production and its total capital and total labor. ( Liang, On the New People, 696) To make sure that the people take production as the individual's responsibility, he stresses that people should be educated so that they would even feel "ashamed" for being only the one who shared the interests but not the one who produced them. ( Liang, On the New People, 702) In his formulation, not only physical productivity but also intellectual as well as moral productivity are counted in the line of production. Everyone in the nation is considered
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as a member in the system of the production machine. Education entered into scene of the production system under this reasoning and calculation so as to secure the optimal interest of the nation and to build up the people's "psyche force," that is, their intellectual and moral capacities. 17 Throughout his argumentation for the new people project, Liang Qichao inserts here and there his passionate and poignant lamentations. "Alas, alas, how can we not fear and alarmed!" "It is painful and mournful for us not to have our nation to protect us, just as the orphans without their parents to cling to." "Horror! Horror! I could not see how our nation could stand on its own feet." "I'm deeply ashamed to see our current situation." "I'm all tearful when I observe the current conditions of our nation." "Our young people are all so fragile that I do not see even a solid society form by a hundred people. Our nation is coming to its end!" ( Liang, On the New People, 657, 664, 665, [666] [667] 672, 693, [701] [702] 706) 18 Such strong emotional exclamations, including his identification of the situation to be ashamed of, feared, worried and alarmed, as well as his rhetoric of the parent-children metaphor, the cutting line between the beast and the human, the imminent danger of the nation-state, all reinforce the legitimacy of his argumentations for the ethico-political economy for the individual in society. The free competition of the liberal economy in the framework of the autonomous consensus with the nation-state-community therefore is at work for the new national subject of the modern China.
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and employs the notion of ether and electricity as metaphors to explain the power of thought in operation. According to him, the force of thought is like electricity, transmittable through "ether," and can be tamed, utilized and harnessed for utility as long as we learn the laws that govern the force of thought. The phrase "zhixin" (治心) used by John Fryer in the title of his translation and throughout his book conveys explicitly the meaning of "mind-cure" and "mind-governmentality," both ideas highly welcomed by late Qing intellectuals. 24 It is significant for scholars such as Trescott and Liang Taigen to observe the reception and circulation of Burton's book on political economy in the East Asian regions. However, either in Trescott's emphasis on the moral dimension in Fukusawa Yukichi's writings, or in Taigen's emphasis on the evolutionist version of enlightenment and civilization, the role political economy played in the process of ethical subjectivation was overlooked. In Burton's text, the free and autonomous economic agent is crucial in the entire system of the political economy. He writes:
Political economy … is not a system for controlling men's actions, but for discovering how men are induced by their natural propensities to act: it has not so much influence in teaching men how to direct each other, as in teaching them the cases in which control is useless or mischievous. (49, emphasis mine) 25 The issue of government is not in its control, but in its capacity to induce the capacity or the appetite in each individual, be it intellectual or moral, so that the agent is freely and autonomously willing to offer his service for the larger community. When the logic of the political economy is superimposed and incorporated into the logic of ethical economy, the individual's intellectual state and moral state are counted as part of the productive capacity according to the national interest or the collective good defined by the state; likewise, the ethical and economic subject, or the national subject, is placed in the measurement of the line of production.
4. Political economy and the ethical subject intertwined in the knot 26 The ethical subject formulated by Liang Qichao is a subject of truth prescribed to fit the best interest of the state and is defined by the physiology of the state. Furthermore, this physiological structure of the state treats the human psyche as the object of its governmentality with the logic of political economy. The true subject, or rather, the true ethico-economic subject in Liang's vision, is the man as a little machine, as the human capital, both as the subject and as the object in the ethico-economic regimes, expected to join the line of production. Tuned with such liberalist vision of the society, the principle of the least government with the maximum effect is demanded. That is, as Foucault pointed out, the core factor in this management was the mechanism of the formation of truth basing on the raison d'État. Foucault wrote: "[Instead of] continuing to saturate this site of the formation of truth with an unlimited regulatory governmentality, it is recognized -and this is where the shift takes place -that it must be left to function with the least possible intervention precisely so that it can both formulate its truth and propose it to governmental practice as rule and norm." Foucault added that the site of truth is not in "the heads of economists," but is "the market." (Foucault 2008: 29-30) 27 What is the market for the state? Foucault points out that it is nothing else except for the site of justice, of values, of price, and of veridiction. The useful and the utilizable turn out to be veridical and desirable. Through the sense of interest, the government can hold on everything that exists for it, "in the form of individuals, actions, words, wealth, resources, property, rights and so forth" (Foucault 2008: 45) . The entire strategy of governmentality therefore relies not on the total control but on the law of life, that is, the rules for a game, "in which each remains master regarding himself and his part, then the judicial, instead of being reduced to the simple function of applying the law, acquires a new autonomy and importance" (Foucault 2008: 175) . The autonomy of the individual therefore is essential in the self-governmentality of the regime of ethics as well as the regime of truth. To analyze the mechanism of this regime, Foucault suggests, we do not need to analyze the historical logic of processes, but should undertake instead the analysis of the "internal rationality" or the "wage" of individuals' activity. The wage, or the income, reconsidered in this context, is the capital or, as Irving Fisher points out, the source of future income (Foucault 2008: 223-230) .
28 Liang's entire project for the new people is certainly based on such type of the molding and shaping, through cultivation and education, of the people into the ethical-economic subject of the modern China. The individual in this economic and political framework is then viewed not merely as human labor but as the source of future income, as an earning machine or the human capital. The formation of the human capital into effective productive machine is the telos of governmentality and of educational investments. The fundamental reasoning in this logic, the "regressive end point" in the analysis, as Foucault phrased, is the calculation of the "painful or non-painful nature" of the situation (Foucault 2008: 272 ). Liang's repeated emphasis of the threat of the invasion by the foreign countries had already successfully depicted a picture of danger. The self-interest and self-preservation, viewed with the interest and preservation of the nation, is the anchorage for subjective will and action. Partaking in the act of the production /
preservation in the name of national interest then is rationalized as a moral imperative for the new ethical subject.
29 The difficult question Foucault posed for us in The Hermeneutics of the Subject on the problem of the ethical subject is: "Am I really the ethical subject of the truth I know?" (Foucault 2005: 487) The subject constituted by the form of reflexivity specific to certain type of care of the self, the mastery of tekhne over bios, according to Foucault, is the ethical subject of truth appears and is experienced. However, this ethical subject thus appeared and experienced has been formed through the knowledge, education and the particular tekhne over bios at different moments in history. Foucault writes:
Although the theory of political power as an institution usually refers to a juridical conception of the subject of right, it seems to me that the analysis of governmentality--that is to say, of power as a set of reversible relationships--must refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the relationship of self to self. Quite simply, this means that in the type of analysis I have been trying to advance for some time you can see that power relations, governmentality, the government of the self and of others, and the relationship of self to self constitute a chain, a thread, and I think it is around these notions that we should be able to connect together the question of politics and the question of ethics. (Foucault 2005: 252) 30 The question arises exactly when the logic of ethics was superimposed with other logics and other telos, be it the religious supreme imperatives, or the political common good for the nation-sate, or the economic interest of the entrepreneurs. The problem of ethics is crucial if we want to analyze the notion of governmentality.
31 The significance of Liang Qichao's discourse of the political economy of the ethical subject lies in the fact that it reflected the sort of discursive mode popular in late nineteenth century Japan, late Qing China as well as the early Republic. After the Meiji Restoration, discourses of ethics had been fused with the physiological ideas of the state and were dominated by biological-evolutionist theories. The Japanese Ministry of Education was strongly promoting theories of the State as a natural and organic body. One typical example that could illustrate the discursive situation was the translation of Gustav Adolph Constantin Frantz's (佛郎都) Physiologie der Staaten (physiology of the State 國家 生理學) into Japan in 1884. The Meiji Ministry of Education conducted the translation of this book, as in many other cases. The publication of the translation reflected the policies of Ito Hirobumi and Mori Arinori who advocated for the modernization of Japanese education system. Frantz states repeatedly in his book that the main concern of his writing was "political physiology" or "State physiology." He treats the state as an organic body, similar to a plant or animal. If the circulation of the "fluids" within the body does not function smoothly, then the State would be weak. Furthermore, the internal organization of the State must be determined by the State's purpose, just as the organic parts of an animal dominated by its head. The government is the principal organ charged with the task of achieving the goals of the State. (Frantz, 179-180) Frantz's notion of the physiology of the State was translated in the book in kanji as Kokutai (國體), literary national body, and was widely circulated in the contemporary discourses that lasted through the first several decades of the twentieth century. Inoue Tetsujiro's 1891 "Commentary on the Imperial Edict on Education," for example, presented a physiological view of the State and a hierarchic understanding of ethics of the national subject under the service of the State. Educational principles in the ethical mode are phrased, such as: "A ruler is to his people as parents are to their children," "A nation is like an organic body...The ruler is like the mind, the people like the body and limbs." In Rüstow's definition of Vitalpolitik perfectly illustrates the practice of bio-politics in the early modern China: a "a policy of life" with which not only the worker's labor but also "the worker's whole vital situation, his real, concrete situation, from morning to night and from night to morning," as well as the "material and moral hygiene, the sense of property, the sense of social integration," are all counted (quoted by Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. p. 157n). John Fryer's translation of Burton's Political Economy and Henry Wood's Ideal Suggestion through Mental Photograph symptomatically foregrounds the emotional demand of the age for the appropriate forms of knowledge to govern human behavior and human psyche, the former moving from the management of the market to the management of individuals' moral behaviors, and the latter moving from the internal government of the moral hygiene and extending to that of the social hygiene. The meeting place of these two strategic movements of governmentality is the discursive knot of xin, psyche. He repeatedly insists on the importance of the revolution of the xin (心) so that the national body (國體) can be reformed into a healthy state and that the moles in the society should be cleansed. He also advocates in his high school textbook Philosophy of Life that the individual in society is like the cell in an organic body, and that the continuation of the whole race is closely related with the healthy cell. The individual should move toward the practicing and realization of the idealized self and the elimination of the customary old self. We see the circulation of the ethical-political-economy of the bio-ethic-politics from the late Qing intellectuals down to the May-Fourth enlightenment movement of the modern China.
36 A different case at the same turning point, as I discussed in a separate paper, of the interpretation of xinli could be observed in Tan Sitong's (譚嗣同) writings. (Liu 2009a) In Tan's texts of Renxue, the book of Love, published in 1897, we see that the psyche force
defined by him is a dynamic topological continuum. The idea of psyche force as pure negativity allows each body to exist as a singular being, renewable through the force of instant appearing and disappearing of thoughts. To Tan Sitong, this constant local motion of the psyche force keeps the psyche space an open system and altered according to the encounters of the external bodies in the world. Each one is a multitude and opens to yet another multitude, as set opens to multiple subsets. The radical equality of the singular beings is suggested by this notion of such ontological multitude. Tan's psyche force as "micro-appearing-disappearing" unsettled the consolidation of the utilitarian psycheelectricity discourse of his time and challenged the nominal system of the ideological construction of Confucianism. Furthermore, through this dynamic topological perception of being, or the onto-logy, we see the possibility for the force of infinite questioning, the immanent singularity of the thought-to-come. In Tan's philosophy, we see not only a radical political view of the equality of beings, but also a radical view of the ethics that is freed from any fixed nominal ideology of ethics. However, Tan's Buddhist-inspired vision was not pursued. Instead, the road of revolution was ensued after his martyrdom through Liang Qichao's appropriation of Tan's writings. It is the biggest irony that we've observed in the eve of modern China.
37 Another example. Wang Guowei's (王國維) translations of the utilitarian ethics and education theory at the turn of the twentieth century revealed clearly the role that he played as an intellectual that helped instituting modern ideas. His participation both in the publication of the journal Educational World and later in the Ministry of Education of late Qing government fit into the plans of Luo Zhenyu (羅振玉). The impact that Wang and Luo together produced on the Chinese intellectual world was profound. Those early twentieth century theories of ethics and education became the main axis of Chinese ethical thoughts throughout the twentieth century. Wang's philosophical writings during 1904-1097, however, reached on another level. In the series of writings that he explored of the limits of Western and classical Chinese ethics, he tackled with the limitations of dualism. Wang Guowei criticized the intellectuals such as Liang Qichao who clung to utilitarian and political purposes so that they cannot practice philosophical thinking. He criticized utilitarianism and shengsheng zhuyi (life-ism 生生主義) that were popular at his time, especially the ones advocated by Liang Qichao. As an alternative, he developed a notion of wusheng zhuyi (no-life-ism 無生主義). Life-ism to Wang Guowei is the continuous expansion and preservation of life, while no-life-ism is the subtraction of personal subjective will of life. No-life-ism is not a negative or pessimistic account of humanity. Through retreating from the position of the subject that submits to the utilitarian and teleological purposes of politics, the subject could obtain a clearer state of mind. Wang's contemporaries did not follow the path of his philosophical thought either. (Liu 2009b) 38 Liang Qichao, the activist of the revolution and the enlightenment in favor of a modern China, situated himself in an engaging and intervening position as an active subject. His teachings educated a whole generation of modern Chinese subjects, including the May 4 activists. Tan Sitong and Wang Guowei also belonged to this topological knot of the age, but they respectively proposed their different views of the psyche and ethics that was a move subtracted and deviated from the utilitarian count of psyche. Such paths, however, were not taken because the revolution was on the wave.

